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U.S. Senate Votes To Suspend Aid To Nicaragua
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In an unexpected move, on July 28 the US Senate voted 77 to 23 in favor of an amendment blocking
all US aid to Nicaragua until several stringent conditions are met. The amendment, sponsored
by a group of legislators led by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), was attached to unrelated legislation
providing appropriations for US government agencies. Although the amendment is still subject
to approval in the House of Representatives, sponsors of the legislation and observers on Capitol
Hill generally agree that some form of aid suspension against Nicaragua is likely to be approved
by both chambers. Under terms of the Senate amendment, no aid to Nicaragua can be released
until President Bill Clinton first certifies that: * No senior official of the Nicaraguan government,
including the army and police, is linked to "international terrorism;" * The Nicaraguan government
has brought to justice any Nicaraguans involved in the February explosion at the World Trade
Center; * An independent international investigation has been carried out regarding the explosion
of a weapons cache belonging to a Salvadoran rebel group in Managua on May 23. The conditions
contained in the amendment are political fallout from two controversial incidents. On the one hand,
five forged Nicaraguan passports were found in the apartment of one of the suspects arrested in
connection with the February bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. On the other hand,
the May 23 explosion of a secret arms cache at a Managua auto repair shop allegedly revealed
Sandinista tolerance of or direct participation in an extensive network of international leftist
organizations involved in violent political activities. In addition to an array of weapons, among the
debris authorities found more than 300 passports from 22 countries, plus documents pointing to the
existence of an international kidnap-for-cash ring. The weapons arsenal belonged to the Popular
Liberation Forces (Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion, FPL), one of the five factions of El Salvador's
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The FPL has accepted full responsibility for
the weapons. Still, investigations into the cache have not yet revealed the precise nature of the links
between the FPL, the FSLN, and the kidnapping ring. The Senate amendment is aimed at blocking
disbursement of funds still to be delivered from the US$108 million approved for Nicaragua in the
US's fiscal year 1993 foreign aid bill. According to reports from Washington, only US$60 million of
the US$108 million has been disbursed to date. The amendment also seeks to undermine future
congressional approval of a Clinton administration request for US$67 million in aid for fiscal
year 1994. Between June 1992 and April 1993, Sen. Helms succeeded in freezing disbursement of
Nicaragua's fiscal year 1992 aid appropriation. The central argument used by Helms at that time
was the slow pace at which the administration of President Violeta Chamorro was processing
claims by US citizens whose property had been confiscated under the Sandinistas (for coverage
of previous aid suspension, see Central America Update 06/05/92, 04/09/93). Although the timing
of, and overwhelming support for, the amendment came as somewhat of a surprise, momentum
toward some type of aid suspension had been building for weeks. Rumors of an impending aid
cutoff first began to circulate in Managua in early June. In fact, the most recent indication that such
a move was in the offing came from Janet Ballantyne, director for the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) at the embassy in Managua. In an interview published in the July 24 edition
of Managua daily newspaper La Tribuna, Ballantyne confirmed that an imposition of new conditions
for the release of aid funds was under discussion in Washington. "Stability in Nicaragua is very
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fragile," Ballantyne said. "There has been lots of talk about new conditions, but nothing definitive
has emerged yet...I wouldn't say the aid is in danger, but it is imperative that [Chamorro] reach an
agreement with Washington." Ballantyne's comments came just ten days after State Department
spokesperson Mike McCurry had warned that the Clinton administration would consider "the
ability of the [Nicaraguan] civilian authorities to exercise sufficient control over the armed forces
and police" when deciding on upcoming aid appropriations. In the Senate, the immediate precursor
to the amendment was a "sense of the Senate" resolution adopted in a July 15 voice vote. The nonbinding resolution, introduced by Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), laid out conditions for Nicaragua
similar to those contained in the July 28 amendment. According to the text of the resolution, aid
to Nicaragua should be cut off until investigations are completed into "the relationship of the
Sandinista National Liberation Front to acts of terrorism, which threaten to undermine the security
of the United States and the political stability and economic prosperity of the Western Hemisphere
and the Free World." Ironically, the Senate's July 28 vote came on the heels of persistent behindthe-scenes efforts by the Chamorro government to address the very issues raised in the amendment.
On July 20, Chamorro's Interior Minister, Alfredo Mendieta, travelled to Washington to work out
details of participation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Interpol into the arms cache
investigation. Mendieta said that in his meetings with US officials, he stressed that Nicaragua's
relations with the US "should not be determined by the actions of the Sandinista Front, but instead
by the present government, in order to eliminate the excesses of the past." At the same time,
Mendieta reiterated Managua's official position that no proof has yet been presented directly linking
the Sandinistas to the hidden arms cache. News of the Senate vote provoked a flood of reactions in
Managua. In July 29 comments to reporters, Foreign Minister Ernesto Leal rejected the claim that the
Chamorro government has been lax in investigating allegations of international terrorist activities
involving Nicaraguans. Leal read excerpts from a May 5 letter written by a US Embassy official
praising the Nicaraguan government for its cooperation in the ongoing investigations into the
World Trade Center bombing. He added that three suspects are already in jail in Managua for their
role in issuing forged passports. Similarly, regarding ongoing investigations into the arms cache,
Leal reiterated that Managua had invited the participation of the Interpol and of US government
agencies. For her part, President Chamorro expressed disappointment at the decision: "If they want
to cut off aid, let them cut it off...it's sad to live off public charity." Right wing opponents of the
government placed blame for the Senate decision on Chamorro's policy of national reconciliation
and accommodation with the FSLN. They hinted that the move is likely to result in even greater
political isolation for the already embattled government, with some politicians bluntly stating that
the collapse of the Chamorro administration is now on the horizon. Meanwhile, for the FSLN, the
Senate resolution ultimately boils down to the latest expression of a US foreign policy establishment
bent on crushing "Sandinismo" and on scuttling achievements made during the course of the
revolution in the 1980s. According to Daniel Ortega, former president and secretary general of the
FSLN, behind the Senate amendment lie "the interests of conservative sectors in the US which seek
to continue the policy of destabilization against Nicaragua, a policy initiated by Ronald Reagan."
He added that the objective of such policies is to reverse "the transformations initiated by the
Sandinista revolution in 1979." In Managua, many speculated that the ultimate target of the Senate
amendment is the Sandinista Popular Army (Ejercito Popular Sandinista, EPS), beginning with
the removal of army chief Gen. Humberto Ortega. Rumors to this effect were further fueled by a
scathing editorial published in the July 30 edition of the New York Times. Under the title "Testing
Time for Mrs. Chamorro," the editorial endorses the aid cutoff and counsels the Nicaraguan
President to abandon her efforts to govern in cooperation with the Sandinistas. "Keeping Mr.
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Ortega as head of the armed forces was a noble experiment; but the experiment has failed," read the
Times editorial, in a tone reminiscent of the arrogant notes dispatched by Washington diplomats
to Nicaraguan politicians a century ago. "If Mrs. Chamorro can't reassert control, she will lose the
support of the international community. The middle ground on which she stands is eroding quickly.
Mr. Ortega will have to go." For his part, Gen. Ortega reiterated his willingness to step down from
the post under terms established in Nicaraguan law, but not as a result of pressure from abroad.
(Sources: Inter Press Service, 07/22/93; Agence France-Presse, 07/20/93, 07/24/93, 07/28/93, 07/29/93;
Reuter, 07/28/93, 07/29/93)
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